Peru’s Deinstitutionalization Deepens

By Silvio Dragunsky

Peru’s crisis no longer appears to be limited to a crisis of government or political leadership. What is now beginning to be questioned is the very capacity of the institutional system to socially integrate a country increasingly fragmented between formality and informality, legality and illegality, the State and parallel economies.

In previous articles, I argued that Peru’s institutional crisis is not merely a political phenomenon, but rather the superstructural consequence of the emergence of a new social actor: what, for lack of a more precise definition, we may call “the informal sector.”

The 2026 presidential elections probably constitute the clearest expression of this process.

The Growing Weight of “the Informals”

In Peru, it is often repeated that barely 30% of the Economically Active Population has formal employment and full labor-law protection. However, this statement is usually made without considering its logical consequence: the remaining 70% must obtain income through other mechanisms.

This universe includes everything from subsistence activities to complex illegal or semi-illegal economies: informal gold mining, illegal logging in the Amazon, illegal fishing, smuggling, street commerce, state corruption, and, at the highest levels of profitability, the cultivation, processing, and export of cocaine.

Much of these activities take place in territories where the effective presence of the State is weak or directly nonexistent. In such areas, resource appropriation and conflict resolution tend to be organized through direct relationships, without state institutional mediation.

The economic magnitude of this phenomenon is often underestimated. Illegal gold mining alone is estimated to generate around 12 billion dollars annually. If other forms of informal or illegal income are added, it is reasonable to think of a volume close to — or even exceeding — 20 billion dollars per year.

A social sector of such economic and territorial scale inevitably ends up generating its own political expressions, even if these do not adopt the traditional forms of party representation.

The Deinstitutionalization of the State

The fact that Peru has had eight presidents in barely ten years should be enough to illustrate the depth of the crisis. Yet this is only the surface of the problem.

The political mediocrity of many recent governments has been evident. In several cases, presidents reached power not as the result of solid leaderships or coherent national projects, but rather through parliamentary accidents, impeachments, fragile alliances, and short-term maneuvers within Congress.

Just as examples: the unicameral Congress, through legal artifices, introduced constitutional modifications so profound that Peru effectively shifted from a presidential system to a parliamentary one, which helps explain the instability of the presidency.

The crisis also affects the judicial system and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Attorney General’s Office has become immersed in permanent internal disputes, while different factions accuse one another of corruption and political manipulation of justice. The loss of institutional legitimacy is becoming increasingly visible.

The deterioration even extends to bodies traditionally considered technical. The National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE), responsible for administering elections, became involved in a series of episodes during 2026 that revealed the level of state precariousness.

ONPE purchased a new computerized system for a particularly complex election, with 36 presidential candidacies and multiple simultaneous categories. To do so, it acquired thousands of laptops and printers. However, the system experienced widespread failures: printers without ink, defective equipment, and polling stations installed in areas lacking stable electricity.

Eventually, in the middle of election day itself, authorities had to order a return to the traditional manual vote count.

Severe logistical problems were added to this situation. Part of the electoral material arrived late — or never arrived at all — to hundreds of polling stations in Metropolitan Lima. The situation forced authorities to exceptionally enable voting on the following Monday for citizens who had been unable to vote on Sunday.

More than administrative anecdotes, these episodes reflect a State increasingly incapable of efficiently carrying out basic functions.

Fragmented Elections, Weakened Representation

In other words, a very significant portion of society decided not to support any of the available options — despite the fact that there were many and varied alternatives.

The election results ultimately confirmed the depth of the representation crisis.

In a country where voting is mandatory, around 26% of registered voters did not cast a ballot. Among those who did participate, more than 16% either voted blank or spoiled their ballots.

In other words, a very significant portion of society chose not to support any of the available political options.

The extreme fragmentation of the political system also produced very weak results. Keiko Fujimori obtained slightly more than 10% of the total electorate, while Roberto Sánchez reached just above 7%. Both advanced to the runoff election, where one of them will eventually have to obtain 50% plus one of the valid votes.

The paradox is evident: candidates with relatively limited social support will have to attempt to build legitimacy in a context of apathy, fragmentation, and growing public rejection.

The Runoff Candidates

In many cases, the principal asset of a “party” is simply its legal registration, controlled by small leadership groups or directly by a political proprietor.

Traditional political parties in Peru practically disappeared years ago. What predominates today are electoral franchises: legal structures authorized to compete electorally, but lacking territorial organization, stable militancy, or coherent programs.

In many cases, the principal asset of the “party” is its legal registration, administered by small leadership groups or directly by a political owner.

Within this scenario, Fujimorismo remains the most structured and recognizable political force. Represented by Keiko Fujimori, it maintains a conservative orientation with populist components. It also preserves a relatively solid electoral machinery. Its strongest presence is in Metropolitan Lima, upper socioeconomic sectors, and some regions of the coast and northern jungle — partly inherited from the political weight of her father’s government, Alberto Fujimori.

On the other hand, Juntos por el Perú appears as a heterogeneous coalition of left-wing sectors, social democrats, and social movements, articulated around the figure of Roberto Sánchez. Its main electoral base is found in rural Peru, especially in the southern and central Andes, as well as among urban and rural popular sectors.

More than classic parties, both spaces express relatively unstable social and territorial coalitions.

Uncertain Perspectives

The central dispute will be each candidate’s ability to attract sectors that do not feel represented by any of the existing options.

The main polling firms — such as Ipsos Perú, the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP), and Datum — coincide in showing an extremely close runoff race with a high volume of undecided voters.

The central dispute will be the capacity of both candidates to attract sectors that feel represented by none of the existing alternatives.

For this reason, many analysts agree that both Fujimori and Sánchez will attempt to moderate their discourse and move toward more centrist positions. In other words, they will seek to reduce the fears they generate among electorates that distrust both projects.

However, the underlying problem goes beyond the candidates themselves.

Peru’s crisis no longer appears limited to a crisis of government or political leadership. What is now beginning to be questioned is the very capacity of the institutional system to socially integrate a country increasingly fragmented between formality and informality, legality and illegality, the State and parallel economies.

And the 2026 elections have shown that this process is not stopping, but deepening.

Silvio Dragunsky G.
Lima, May 15, 2026

Silviodragunsky.blogspot.com

Sdragunsky@gmail.com

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